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As a condition of the buy-back, the taxpayers entered into a
shared appreciation agreement which required repayment on
a formula basis if the property were conveyed within 10-
years.11  The recapture agreement commitment was secured
by a secondary lien on the land.  In the year of the buy-back,
the Farm Service Agency of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (the successor to FmHA) issued a Form 1099-C
showing “amount of debt cancelled” of $177,772.27.12  The
taxpayers did not report the amount as discharge of
indebtedness on their income tax return in the year of the
buy-back.
The key issue before the court was whether the recapture
agreement continued the taxpayer’s obligations to
FmHA/FSA in a manner that there was no discharge of
indebtedness in the year of the buy-back of collateral.  As the
court noted, the disagreement was over the contingency
involved.  The taxpayers argued that the cancellation itself
was contingent, believing that the transaction merely
generated an agreement to cancel their debt at a future time.
On the other hand, IRS argued that the transaction involved a
present cancellation with a contingent future obligation to
pay.13
The Tax Court took the position that the taxpayer’s
indebtedness was discharged in the year of the buy-back of
the collateral.14  The court’s reasoning was that “whether or
when [the taxpayer] would ever be required to make any
further payments to FmHA rested totally within their own
control.15  As the court explained, if the taxpayers chose to
sell their property within 10-years, repayment would be
required; if the taxpayers chose not to dispose of their
property, nothing further would be due.16
In conclusion
The decision in Jelle v. Comm’r17 is consistent with the IRS
position taken in a letter dated May 22, 1989 from IRS to the
Farmers Home Administration18  I  that letter, the Chief
Counsel stated “…the Recapture Agreement is not a
substitute indebtedness for any of the FmHA debt in excess
of the buyout amount.  Thus, an FmHA borrower realizes
discharge of indebtedness income to the extent the old FmHA
debt balance exceeds the buyout amount even when a
Recapture Agreement is part of the restructuring
rrangement….”19
The IRS position has been that the same result applies to a
debt write down.20  Although Jelle v. Commissioner21
involved only a buy-back at net recovery value,22 the case
provides support for the IRS position on a debt write-down as
well.
FOOTNOTES
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
ADMINISTRATIVE CLAIMS . The debtors had leased
farmland from a creditor. The landlords’ liens were not
perfected and were avoided by the Chapter 7 trustee.
However, the debtors used the farms during the bankruptcy
case, planting the crops just before filing for bankruptcy and
harvesting the crops 142 days later. The landlords filed
administrative claims for the rental of the properties during
the bankruptcy case. The Bankruptcy Court had determined
the rental value of the properties by multiplying the annual
rent by a fraction equal to the number of days the property
was used by the bankruptcy estate divided by 365. The
appellate court remanded the case because the use of the
number 365 failed to take into account the limited use and
lower rental value of a farm during nonproductive months.
Th  c urt noted that, in this case, the bankruptcy estate had
the us  of the farm during nearly the entire productive period
of the farm for the year, from planting to harvest. The court
required the fair rental value to be determined by the
usefulness of the property during the bankruptcy case. In re
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Wedermeier, 239 B.R. 794 (Bankr. 8th Cir. 1999), aff’d,
237 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2001).
SETOFF. The debtor was a wholesale distributor of food
products which had contracted with a manufacturer of pickle
products. The debtor placed the purchased pickle products in
a warehouse for resale to retailers and the military. The
debtor would bill the retailers directly and submit the
proceeds to the manufacturer in payment for the pickles sold.
However, when pickles were sold to the military, the
manufacturer billed the military and credited the debtor’s
account with the sale proceeds. At the time of the bankruptcy
filing, the debtor owed the manufacturer for purchased pickle
products and the manufacturer had credits against the
debtor’s accounts from military sales. The manufacturer
sought permission to offset the military sales credit against
the debtor’s account. The manufacturer acknowledged that
setoff was not allowed under the bankruptcy rules but argued
that the doctrine of recoupment allowed the debtor’s account
to be reduced by the military sales credit. The court held that
the doctrine of recoupment was not available in this case
because the debt and credit did not arise from the same
transaction. The court held that the initial sale of the pickle
products to the debtor was too distinct from the later sale of
the products to the military. In re Affiliated of Florida, Inc.,
258 B.R. 495 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY . The debtors filed for Chapter 13 in
May 1996 and listed an unsecured IRS claim for $193. The
debtors’ plan was confirmed in September 1996 without
objection. The debtors filed their 1996 tax return in February
1997 and claimed a refund. The IRS imposed a freeze on the
debtors’ tax account because the debtors were delinquent on
their plan payments. The court adopted the holding of some
prior cases that, upon confirmation, the estate property
revested in the debtors but the estate includes all property
acquired by the debtors post-confirmation; thus, the refund
was estate property protected by the automatic stay. The
court also held that the IRS refusal to pay the refund was a
violation of the automatic stay and awarded the debtors
$1000 in general damages, $12,000 in attorneys’ fees and
$7000 in emotional distress damages. In r  Holden, 258
B.R. 323 (D. Vt. 2000), aff’g, 236 B.R. 156 (Bankr. D. Vt.
1999).
SETOFF.  The IRS had filed secured, unsecured priority
and unsecured nonpriority tax claims in the debtor’s Chapter
13 case. The debtors claimed a pre-petition tax refund as
exempt and the IRS sought permission to apply the refund
against the unsecured nonpriority tax claim, reducing the
dischargeable tax claims. The debtor argued that the tax
refund could be used to offset only the unsecured priority
claims, reducing the nondischargeable tax claims. The court
held that the IRS right of setoff took priority over the debtor’s
claim of exemption; therefore, the IRS could apply the refund
against nonpriority tax claims. In re Martinez, 258 B.R. 364
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2000).
The IRS had filed unsecured priority and unsecured
nonpriority tax claims in the debtor’s Chapter 13 case. The
debtors claimed a pre-petition tax refund as exempt and the
IRS sought permission to apply the refund against the
unsecured nonpriority tax claim, reducing the dischargeable
tax claims. The debtor argued that the tax refund could be
used to offset only the unsecured priority claims, reducing the
nondischargeable tax claims. The IRS argued that the right of
setoff created an involuntary payment of taxes and the IRS
could apply the refund as the IRS wanted. The court held that
Section 522(c) excluded exempt property from liability for
pre-petition taxes except nondischargeable taxes; therefore,
the refund could be applied only to the priority tax claims and
any remaining amount was to be returned to the debtor. This
and the previous case represent the two main approaches to
this issue, which is in need of resolution by the Supreme




BRUCELLOSIS. The APHIS has adopted as final
regulations amending the brucellosis regulations by changing
South Dakota from a Class A to Class Free state. 66 Fed.
Reg. 19847 (April 18, 2001).
COTTON. On December 7, 2000, OSHA issued a direct
final rule amending its occupational health standard for
Cotton Dust, 29 CFR 1910.1043, to add cotton washed in a
batch kier system to the other types of washed cotton that are
partially exempt from the cotton dust standard. See 65 Fed.
Reg. 76563. OSHA has stated that, because no negative
comments were received, the amendment was effective April
6, 2001. 66 Fed. Reg.  18191 (April 6, 2001).
MEAT INSPECTION . The plaintiffs were federal meat
and p ultry inspectors, their union and a private organization.
The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the USDA from instituting
new meat inspection rules under which federal meat
insp ctors would no longer personally inspect the meat
carcasses but would only oversee the inspection performed
by employees of the meat packers. The plaintiff argued that
the Federal Meat Inspection Act (FMIA), 21 U.S.C. § 604,
required the federal inspectors to do the inspections. The
USDA argued that the term “inspection” included observing
others do the inspection but the court held that the plain
meaning of the statute prohibited the USDA from allowing
anyone but federal inspectors to do the inspection of
processed meat. After the first appellate decision, the USDA
modified the inspection procedure to have one inspector
observe all carcasses and one inspector float throughout the
line to oversee the other inspections. The plaintiffs argued
that, although the modifications met the statutory
requirements, the single inspector of the carcasses was
insufficient to properly inspect the carcasses. The District
Court, on remand, held that the modified rules met the
statutory requirements.   American Fed. Of Employees v.
Glickman, 127 F. Supp.2d 243 (D. D.C. 2001), on rem.
from, 215 F.3d 7 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
POTATOES. The AMS has issued a proposed rule setting
forth the terms of the Fresh Russet Potato Diversion Program
for 2000. The proposed program will assist fresh Russet
potato growers faced with oversupplies and low prices by
diverting potatoes to charitable institutions, for livestock
68 Agricultural Law Digest
*Agricultural Law Manual (ALM).
feed, to convert them to  ethanol, and to render them
nonmarketable and dispose of them in accordance with




GIFT . The decedent’s predeceased spouse had owned a
corporation and served as chief executive officer. The spouse
had given annual gifts of stock in the corporation to the
spouse’s executive assistant. After the corporation was sold,
the spouse gave money instead of stock. The spouse filed gift
tax returns for the amounts given to the assistant. The
decedent was advised to file amended gift tax returns which
would treat the gifts as compensation but the decedent
refused. After the decedent’s death, the advisor became the
executor of the decedent’s estate and filed amended gift tax
returns on behalf of the estate claiming that the stock and
money transfers were actually compensation for services by
the assistant. The estate argued that money and property
transferred to an active employee could not be a gift. The
court acknowledged that the employment relationship of the
donor and donee could be a factor in determining the nature
of a transfer. The court denyed summary judgment for either
party because the determination of a gift was dependent upon
several fact issues to be determined by the trier of fact.
Estate of Powell v. United States, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,327 (W.D. Va. 2001).
Just prior to death, the decedent wrote several checks to
relatives for under $10,000 each. The checks were delivered
to the donees before the decedent’s death but were not paid
until after the decedent’s death. The court ruled that the
checks were incomplete gifts at the time of the decedent’s
death because the gifts were revocable by the decedent’s
ability to stop payment on the checks. Therefore, the amount
of the checks was included in the decedent’s estate. Rosano
v. United States, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,359 (2d
Cir. 2001), aff’g, 67 F. Supp. 2d 113 (E.D. N.Y. 1999).
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX . The
decedent owned and operated 82 residential rental properties.
The decedent or the decedent’s employees performed all of
the management and maintenance services for the properties.
The decedent also had excess cash-on-hand from the rental
properties, which was the insurance proceeds paid from the
loss of one property by fire. The decedent had intended to use
the money to replace the destroyed unit. The IRS ruled that
the decedent’s interest in the rental properties was one
business and was eligible for installment payment of estate
tax as an interest in a closely held business. The IRS also
ruled that the excess cash-on-hand was included in the value
of the rental property business. Ltr. Rul. 200114005, Dec.
15, 2000.
MARITAL DEDUCTION . The decedent’s will created an
annuity trust for the surviving spouse with an annuity amount
of $100,000 annually. The trust also provided for an increase
in the annuity to adjust for inflation. The decedent’s estate
representative elected to treat the trust as QTIP and included
the value of the annuity with the inflation provision in the
value of the trust for marital deduction purposes. The court
held that the marital deduction was limited to the amount of
the trust needed to produce the annuity but that the inflation
increases could not be considered because the increases were
contingent upon any inflation occurring. Estate of Sansone
v. United States, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,399
(C.D. Calif. 2001).
VALUATION . The decedent’s house had been destroyed
by fire and the decedent had obtained an agreement from the
insurance company for the rebuilding of the original
residence. The cost of rebuilding was far greater than the
value of the original residence because of the historic nature
of the building. At the decedent’s death, the building was
only 57 percent completed, although the insurance company
still was obligated to pay for reconstruction if the residence
was completed. The decedent’s estate valued the residence,
for estate tax purposes, as an incomplete building and
deducted the cost of completing the reconstruction. The IRS
sought to include the fair market value of the residence as
completed because the estate was entitled to have the
residence reconstruction completed and paid for by the
insurance company. The court held that the date of death
determined the point at which the estate property was to be
valued; therefore, the residence was to be valued as an
incomplete building with no consideration to future costs or
reimbursements. The court held that the insurance company
obligation was too contingent to be recognized as an asset of
the estate on the decedent’s date of death. Estate of Bull v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-92.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
LEGISLATION . The Joint Committee on Taxation on
April 19 released its “General Explanation of Tax Legislation
Enacted in the 106th Congress,” which follows the
chronological order of the tax legislation as signed into law.
JCS-2-01.
BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer was a neurologist
wh  owned 49 acres of rural property. The land consisted of
six acres of hay fields, forest and open land. The property
was also used as the taxpayer’s residence. The taxpayer
purchased a tractor and fuel storage tank and claimed I.R.C. §
179 expense method depreciation deduction for the
equipment. The tractor was used to cut the grass and weeds
along the perimeter of the property and the fuel tank held fuel
for the tractor. The court held that the taxpayer was not
entitled to a depreciation deduction for the tractor and tank
because the equipment was not used in the taxpayer’s
farming business. Solomon v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op.
2001-53.
The taxpayer retired from the U.S. Air Force in 1989 as an
engineer and began looking for civilian work in the same
area. The taxpayer worked for a short time in 1991 but did
not find permanent employment until 1999. The taxpayer
claimed deductions for a home office, travel expenses and
various other business expenses for 1995 and 1996 which
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were disallowed by the IRS. The court acknowledged that job
hunting expenses were generally deductible within a
reasonable period but held that expenses incurred more than
three years after employment in 1991 were not reasonable or
deductible. Ellis v. Comm’r, T. C. Summary Op. 2001-52.
The taxpayer was employed by a state as an insurance
examiner. The employment contract described the taxpayer
as an independent contractor, although the state withheld and
paid social security taxes on the amounts paid under the
contract. The taxpayer sought unemployment insurance
benefits after the contract was terminated but the state
unemployment insurance commission ruled that the taxpayer
was an independent contractor and not entitled to
unemployment insurance. The taxpayer claimed deductions
for travel, meals and other expenses associated with the
taxpayer’s duties as an examiner. The taxpayer maintained an
appointment log, credit card receipts and other receipts to
substantiate the expenses; however, the court found much of
the log to be unreliable because it was contradicted by the
receipts. The IRS also argued that the taxpayer was not
entitled to business deductions because the expenses were
incurred during employment. The court held that the state
unemployment insurance commission ruling that the taxpayer
was an independent contractor was correct; therefore, the
taxpayer was entitled to claim business expense deductions.
The court disallowed the expenses claimed above those
allowed by the IRS for lack of substantiation. Goins v.
Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-55.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS. The U.S.
Supreme Court has denied certiorari in the following case.
The taxpayer had filed a wrongful termination suit against an
employer and received a judgment for back pay, front pay,
and pension benefits. Under the taxpayer’s legal fee
arrangement with the taxpayer’s lawyers, about two-thirds of
the award was paid to the taxpayer’s attorneys. The court
held that, under Alaska law, the lien for an attorney’s fees did
not create a property interest in the award. The court held that
the taxpayer could not exclude the attorneys’ fees from
income, because the attorneys did not have a property interest
in the fee portion of the award. The taxpayer, however, could
claim the fees as a miscellaneous deduction. See also Harl,
“Handling Legal Fees in Settlements,” 11 Agric. L. Dig. 129
(2000). Coady v. Comm’r, 2000-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,528 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, ___ S. Ct. __ (2001).
 The taxpayer operated an orchids growing and wholesale
business. The taxpayer sprayed the orchid with a fungicide
which eventually caused the loss of all plants and the closing
of the business. The taxpayer sought compensation from the
fungicide manufacturer which first provided assistance
payments. The taxpayer sued the manufacturer for lost
profits, loss of business, diminution of sales, additional
business expenses, a reduction in the value of the plaintiffs'
business, lost plants, and a diminution of the value of the
plaintiffs' nursery as a result of contamination of the soil. The
taxpayer received a jury verdict and the parties reached a
settlement agreement during the appeal. The taxpayer
excluded the assistance payments and the settlement from
income. The Tax Court held that all payments were included
in income because the assistance payments were not gifts or
loans and the lawsuit involved claims for loss of property and
loss of business reputation, none of which were personal
injuries. The appellate court reversed and remanded, holding
that any damages received for injury to the taxpayer’s
business reputation were excludible from income as personal
injury damages. The appellate case is designated as not for
publication. On remand, the Tax Court held that none of the
settlement proceeds were allocable to loss of business
reputation because (1) the taxpayer’s attorney advised the
jury that the taxpayer was not seeking compensation for loss
of business reputation and (2) the settlement made no
allocation of the proceeds to the loss of business reputation
claim.  Henry v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-86, on rem.
from, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,330 (11th Cir.
2001), rev’g, T.C. Memo. 1999-205.
DEPRECIATION . The taxpayer operated a welding
bus ss and had claimed current deductions for three pieces
of welding equipment as supplies. The IRS determined that
the equipment was depreciable personal property and
disallowed the deductions. The taxpayer sought to amend the
tax return to claim a Section 179 expense method
depreciation deduction for the equipment. The IRS argued
t at the Section 179 election was not allowed because the
election was not made on the first return. The court held that
the IRS did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the
taxpayer to amend the tax return to include the Section 179
electi n. Patton v. Comm’r, 116 T.C. No. 17 (2001).
DISASTER PAYMENTS . On March 28, 2001, the
President determined that certain areas in Massachusetts were
eligible for assistance under the Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5121, as a result of
record snow fall on March 5, 2001. FEMA-3165-EM. On
March 28, 2001, the President determined that certain areas
in New Hampshire were eligible for assistance under the Act
as a result of record snow fall on March 5, 2001. FEMA-
3166-EM. Accordingly, a taxpayer who sustained a loss
attributable to the disasters may deduct the loss on his or her
2000 federal income tax return.
ELECTRICITY CREDIT . The IRS has published the
inflation adjustment factor and reference prices that are to be
used in etermining the availability of the I.R.C. § 45(a)
renew ble electricity production credit. These figures apply
to calendar year 2001 sales of kilowatt hours of electricity
produced in the United States or a possession from qualified
energy resources. The inflation adjustment factor for calendar
year 2001 is 1.1641, and the reference prices are 2.57 cents
per kilowatt hour for facilities producing electricity from
wind energy resources and zero cents per kilowatt hour for
facilities producing electricity from closed loop biomass and
poultry waste. The renewable electricity production credit for
calendar year 2001 is 1.7 cents per kilowatt hour on the sale
of electricity produced from wind, closed-loop biomass, and
poultry waste energy resources.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayers owned an S corporation
which owned and operated a recycling business and a farm.
The farm was leased from another corporation owned by the
taxpayers and the S corporation leased a portion of the farm
to an unrelated party under a grazing lease and used the
remaining portion for livestock and almond orchards. The
court held that the S corporation did not operate the farm with
the intent to make a profit because (1) the corporation did not
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implement changes to the operations so as to make them
profitable, (2) the taxpayers did not have expertise on how to
operate a farm and the corporation failed to seek the advice of
experts on how to make the farm profitable, (3) expenses
were maximized and receipts minimized in the method of
operating the farm, the corporation had high profits from the
recycling business which were offset by the farm losses, (4)
the losses increased each year, and (5) the taxpayer spent
considerable time on the recycling business and not the farm
business. O’Connor, v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-90.
IRA . The taxpayer was an attorney who operated a law
practice through a professional corporation. The corporation
provided a defined benefit, single-employer pension plan for
the taxpayer and made all of the contributions to the plan.
The taxpayer received a distribution from the plan and rolled
the distribution over to an IRA. The taxpayer received an
early distribution from the IRA but did not include the
distribution in income. The IRS assessed taxes based on
including the IRA distribution in the taxpayer’s income. The
court held that the distribution was includible in the
taxpayer’s income because the taxpayer failed to provide any
evidence or argument to support the failure to include the
distribution in income. Pena v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-
95.
INNOCENT SPOUSE DEFENSE. The taxpayer was
married to a person who operated a cattle-raising activity.
The taxpayer helped keep the records for the activity and
knew that the activity was not profitable. The taxpayer
testified that the spouse and taxpayer expected the activity to
become profitable. The taxpayer separated from the spouse in
1993 and the couple was divorced in 1996. The taxpayer
knew the spouse continued the cattle-raising activity in 1993
but did not participate in any aspect of the activity. The IRS
disallowed deductions for expenses of the cattle-raising
activity for 1993 in excess of income because the IRS ruled
that the activity was not engaged in for profit. The taxpayer
was assessed for the tax deficiency arising from the
disallowed deductions. The taxpayer sought relief from the
liabilty for the taxes under the innocent spouse defense. The
court held that the IRS failed to prove that the taxpayer knew
that the former spouse engaged in the cattle-raising activity
without an intent to make a profit. King v. Comm’r, 116
T.C. No. 16 (2001).
INSTALLMENT REPORTING . The taxpayer owned a
housing construction business. The taxpayer purchased land
and built 58 homes on subdivided lots. The homes were sold
through a third party real estate broker and the taxpayer
accepted promissory notes for part of the purchase price. The
taxpayer reported only the portion of the notes actually paid
in each tax year, using the installment method of reporting
the income from the notes. The court held that, under I.R.C. §
453(b)(2)(A),  the taxpayer was not entitled to use the
installment of reporting income from the notes because the
taxpayer was a dealer in that the homes were held for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of the taxpayer’s business.
Raymond v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-96.
The taxpayer, a trust, owned a meat packing business which
was operated by the beneficiaries’ family for many years.
The business had financial trouble and was sold to another
company for cash and promissory note. The note provided for
payments depending upon the net income of the business but
also provided for full payment by a date certain. The
company was later resold and the notes were modified as to
the payment schedules. The taxpayers did not include the
face value of the note in income for the year of the first sale.
The taxpayers argued that the note had no ascertainable value
in the first year as an open transaction because the payments
w re uncertain in that the payments depended upon the net
income of the business. The court held that the open
transaction rule was rarely applied because gain could be
reported by the installment method of reporting. The court
held that the notes had an ascertainable value in the year of
sale because the business was well established and was
reasonably expected to provide annual net income. Ber ice
Patton Testamentary Trust v. United States, 2001 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,332 (Fed. Cls. 2001).
The taxpayers owned an S corporation which
manufactured, sold and leased farm irrigation equipment. The
company provided financing to the buyers by taking
promissory notes as part of the purchase price. The
c rporation reported the income from these sales on the
installment method. The taxpayers agreed that dealers are not
allowed the use of installment reporting of gain from the sale
of personal property in the course of business. However, the
taxpayers argued that the exception for farm property in
I.R.C. § 453(l)(2)(A) applied to allow installment reporting
because the irrigation equipment was used in farming by the
purchasers. The court held that the exception applied only to
farmers who sell personal property used by both the buyer
and seller in a farming business; therefore, the taxpayer was
not entitled by the exception to use the installment method of
reporting. Thom v. United States, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,345 (D. Neb. 2001).
INTEREST . The IRS has ruled that interest or other fees
imposed by credit card companies on tax payments made
with  credit card are not deductible as interest. The IRS
ruled that the interest is a personal interest expense. In
addition, the IRS ruled that the prohibition of fees and
charges, under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6311-2T(a), for
payment of taxes by credit card did not apply to credit card
companies. CCA Ltr. Rul. 200115032, Feb. 12, 2001.
INVESTMENT INCOME . The taxpayer purchased silver
coins using money borrowed specifically for the purchases.
The taxpayer also owned residential rental properties which
th  taxpayer managed and maintained. The taxpayer sought
to claim the interest paid on the silver coin purchase loans as
an offset against the income from the rental properties. The
court held that the income from the rental properties was not
investment income because the taxpayer materially
participated in that activity. The court also held that, because
the taxpayer had no investment income from the silver coins
or the r ntal properties, the investment interest from the silver
oin loans was not deductible. Ritt r v. Comm’r, T.C.
Summary Op. 2001-57.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
TERMINATION. An S corporation was administratively
dissolved by the state because the corporation failed to file an
annual report. The corporation was unaware of the
dissolution for some time but took the necessary steps to
reincorporate as soon as the state action was discovered. The
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IRS ruled that the administrative dissolution and
reincorporation did not terminate the Subchapter S election or
the corporation’s tax status as a corporation. Lt . Rul
200114029, Jan. 8, 2001.




AFR 4.25 4.21 4.19 4.17
110 percent AFR 4.68 4.63 4.60 4.59
120 percent AFR 5.11 5.05 5.02 5.00
Mid-term
AFR 4.77 4.71 4.68 4.66
110 percent AFR 5.25 5.18 5.15 5.12
120 percent AFR 5.73 5.65 5.61 5.58
Long-term
AFR 5.43 5.36 5.32 5.30
110 percent AFR 5.99 5.90 5.86 5.83
120 percent AFR 6.53 6.43 6.38 6.35
Rev. Rul. 2001-22, I.R.B. 2001-___.
TRAVEL EXPENSES . The taxpayer was self-employed
in insurance sales. The business required the taxpayer to
travel to other cities to meet with clients. The taxpayer
maintained an appointment calendar which included the
names of cities, the names of the people visited and the
number of miles traveled. The court found that the listing of
names was not credible evidence because the names were
added after the IRS audited the taxpayer’s returns. The court
also discredited the mileage figures because the figures were
often clearly incorrect, based on the other information in the
calendar. The court held that the mileage deductions were
properly disallowed by the IRS for lack of substantiation.
Marquardt v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-59.
WITHHOLDING TAXES. The taxpayer was a
professional baseball team which was required to pay back
wages under an employment settlement. The employees who
received the payments did not work for the team in the year
the back wages were paid. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that, under Bowman v. United States, 824 F.2d
528 (6th Cir. 1987), the wages were taxable under the FICA
and FUTA rules in effect in the years the wages were earned,
not when they were paid. The Sixth Circuit case was
designated as not for publication. The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the back wages were to be taxed under
FICA and FUTA tax rules in effect in the year the back
wages were paid and not when the wages were earned.
Cleveland Indians Baseball Co. v. United States, 2001-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,341 (S. Ct. 2001), rev’g, 215
F.3d 1325 (6th Cir. 2000).
PRODUCT LIABILITY
PESTICIDE . The plaintiff purchased a pesticide for the
control of weevils in stored peas. The pesticide was
manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff sought recovery
for breach of express and implied warranty from statements
on the package labels, and manuals and for negligent oral
misrepresentations by the defendant’s employees. In the first
case, the court held that the breach of warranty claims were
preempted by FIFRA because the claims arose from
information on the product’s labels. The plaintiff had plead
two kinds of oral representations by the defendant’s
employees. The first involved statements which reiterated the
information on the product label. The second set of
representations involved information comparing the product
to other products. The court held that the first oral
representations were not actionable because they involved
information on the product label and were preempted by
FIFRA. However, the court held that the claim arising from
the second set of oral representations involving comparison
of the product to other products was not preempted by FIFRA
because the comparative representations involved
information not found on the label and were voluntarily made
for commercial advantage. M & H Enterprises v. Tri State
Delta Chemicals, Inc., 984 S.W. 2d 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
On remand, the trial court granted summary judgment to the
defendant on the negligent misrepresentation claim because
the court found that no false statements were made by the
defendant and that any errors in the instruction manual or
label were pre-empted by FIFRA because the instructions
were approved by the EPA. The appellate court affirmed. M
& H Enterprises v. Tri State Delta Chemicals, Inc., 984
S.W. 2d 175 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998).
The plaintiff was injured while applying wood preservative
as part of the plaintiff’s employment. The plaintiff sued the
pr ervative manufacturer for negligent design, manufacture,
distribution, formulation, marketing, testing and selling of the
ch mical. The plaintiff also alleged breach of implied and
express warranties, fraudulent misrepresentation and strict
liability. The court first ruled that any claim based upon label
requirements would be preempted by FIFRA. The court held
that the implied warranty claims were preempted because the
claims were based solely on the label contents. The court
denied summary judgment on the express warranty claim and
required the plaintiff to set forth more explicit bases for this
claim. The court noted that express warranty claims are
generally not preempted by FIFRA because express
warranties are voluntarily provided by the manufacturer;
however, if the claim was based on statements on the label,
the claim was preempted. The court gave a similar ruling to
the claim of fraudulent misrepresentation because the
plaintiff’s pleading failed to state whether the source of the
misrepresentations was the label or other statements made by
the manufacturer. The court held that the strict liability claim
was not preempted by FIFRA because the claim was based
on design defects. Johnson v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 129
F. Supp.2d 189 (N.D. N.Y. 2001).
CITATION UPDATES
Catalano v. Comm’r, 240 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’g,
T.C. Memo. 1998-447 (S corporation business expenses) see
p. 47 supra.
Witzel v. Comm’r, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,339
(7 h Cir. 2001), on rem. from, 2001-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
¶ 50,164 (S. Ct. 2001), rev’g, 200 F.3d 496 (7th Cir. 2000),
aff’g in part, T.C. Memo. 1999-64, (discharge of
indebtedness) see 11 Agric. L. Dig.  21.
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The Agricultural Law Press presents
2001 AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
   May 8-11, 2001  Airport Holiday Inn, Denver, CO
   June 19-22, 2001  Ramada Conference Center, Columbia, MO
   July 31, August 1-3, 2001  Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle, PA
   October 2-5, 2001  Interstate Holiday Inn, Grand Island, NE
Come join us for expert and practical seminars on the essential aspects of agricultural tax and law. Gain insight and
understanding from two of the nation’s top agricultural tax and law instructors.
The seminar are held at each site on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday. Registrants may attend one, two,
three or all four days, with separate pricing for each combination. On Tuesday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch
income tax. On Wednesday, Dr. Harl will cover farm and ranch estate planning. On Thursday, Roger McEowen will
cover farm and ranch business planning. On Friday, Roger McEowen will cover current developments in several other
areas of agricultural law. Your registration fee includes comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days attended
which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for a small
additional charge. A buffet lunch and break refreshments are also included in the registration fee.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private annuities,
self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income
averaging; earned income credit; commodity futures transactions; paying wages in kind.
• Farm estate planning, including 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax, co-ownership discounts, alternate
valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business deduction (FOBD), marital deduction planning, disclaimers,
planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, trusts, and generation skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited liability
companies.
• Legal developments in farm contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and
environmental law.
Special room discounted rates are available at each hotel for seminar attendees.
The seminar registration fees   for current subscribers    (and for multiple registrations from one firm) to the Agricultural
Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or Principles of Agricultural Law are $180 (one day), $345 (two days), $500
(three days), and $650 (four days).  The registration fees for    n subscribers   are $200, $385, $560 and $720, respectively.
Please Note: the registration fees are higher for registrations within 20 days prior to the seminar, so please call for
availability and the correct fees. More information and a registration form are available online at www. grilawpress.com
For more information, call Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail to robert@agrilawpress.com
